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Introduction: Minds as Mechanisms
Among the most pervasive and fundamental assumptions in cognitive science is that
the human mind (or mind-brain) is a mechanism of some sort: a physical device com-
posed of functionally specifiable subsystems. On this view, functional decomposition
– the analysis of the overall system into functionally specifiable parts – becomes a
central project for a science of the mind, and the resulting theories of cognitive archi-
tecture essential to our understanding of human psychology.
None of this is, of course, in any way distinctive of massive modularity (MM). On the
contrary, these commitments have very wide acceptance among cognitive scientists
and have done so since the inception of the discipline. If MM is of value, then, it is
not merely because it advocates a mechanistic conception of minds; it must also embody
a distinctive, interesting and plausible hypothesis about our cognitive architecture.
The central aim of this chapter is to argue that, as things stand, there is little 
reason to suppose advocates of MM have succeeded in articulating such a 
hypothesis. On some readings, the MM hypothesis is plausible but banal. On other
readings, it is radical but wholly lacking in plausibility. And on still further (more
moderate but still interesting) interpretations, it remains largely unsupported by the
available arguments since there is little reason to suppose that central systems – such
as those for reasoning and decision making – are modular in character. Contrary to
what Peter Carruthers and others maintain, then, the case for MM is not strong. But
it would be wrong to conclude, as Jesse Prinz and others have done, that the mind is
not modular to any interesting degree (Prinz, chapter 2, IS THE MIND REALLY MODULAR?).
This is because it is very plausible that relatively peripheral regions of cognition –
especially for low-level perception – are modular in character. I thus advocate a 
middle way between those who endorse a thoroughgoing massive modularity and
those who reject modularity altogether.
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Here’s how I’ll proceed. In section 1, I clarify the main commitments of MM and
the attendant notion(s) of a module. In section 2, I sketch some of the main theoret-
ical arguments for MM and highlight their deficiencies. In section 3, I very briefly
discuss some problems with the experimental case for MM. In section 4, I outline some
reasons for finding MM at least in radical form implausible. Finally in section 5, 
I argue against those who not merely reject MM but deny minds are modular to any
interesting degree.
1 What’s at Issue?
To a first approximation, MM is the hypothesis that the human mind is largely or
entirely composed from a great many modules. Slightly more precisely, MM can be
formulated as the conjunction of three claims:
Composition Thesis: The human mind is largely or entirely composed from 
modules.
Plurality Thesis: The human mind contains a great many modules.
Central Modularity: Modularity is found not merely at the periphery of the mind
but also in those central regions responsible for reasoning and decision-making.
In what follows I assume advocates of MM are committed to the conjunction of these
claims. Even so, each is amenable to a variety of different interpretations that vary
considerably in interest and plausibility. More needs to be said if we are to get clearer
on what’s at issue.
1.1 Composition Thesis
MM is in large measure a claim about the kinds of mechanisms from which our minds
are composed – viz. it is largely or even entirely composed from modules.1 As stated, this
is vague in at least two respects. First, it leaves unspecified the precise extent to which
minds are composed from modules. In particular, this way of formulating the proposal
accommodates two different positions, which I call strong and weak massive modular-
ity. According to strong MM all cognitive mechanisms are modules. Such a view would
be undermined if we were to discover that any cognitive mechanism was nonmodular
in character. By contrast, weak MM maintains only that the human mind – including
those parts responsible for central processing – are largely modular in structure. In
contrast to strong MM, such a view is clearly compatible with the claim that there
are some nonmodular mechanisms. So, for example, the proponent of weak MM is
able to posit the existence of some nonmodular devices for reasoning and learning.
A second respect in which the above Composition Thesis is vague is that it leaves
unspecified what modules are. For present purposes, this an important matter since the
interest and plausibility of the thesis turns crucially on what one takes modules to be.2
Minimal processing modules
At one extreme, modules are just distinct, functionally characterized cognitive mech-
anisms of the sort that correspond to boxes in a cognitive psychologist’s flow diagram
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(Fodor, 2002). This minimal conception of modules is one some advocates of MM
really appear to adopt. So, for example, Tooby and Cosmides (1992) characterize 
modules as “complex structures that are functionally organized for processing 
information” (Tooby and Comsides, 1992; see also Pinker, 2005). Even so, it is too
weak for an interesting and distinctive Composition Thesis since almost all cognit-
ive scientists agree that minds are composed from such mechanisms. But it does not
follow from this alone that a distinctive version of MM cannot be formulated in terms
of this anodyne notion (Fodor, 2005; Prinz, chapter 2). In particular, some have 
suggested that an MM formulated with this notion is interesting not because it claims
minds are composed of minimal modules but because it claims there are a large 
number of such mechanisms (Carruthers, chapter 1, THE CASE FOR MASSIVELY MODULAR
MODELS OF MIND). I consider this suggestion in section 1.2.
Robust modules
So, the minimal notion of a module won’t suffice for an interesting Composition Thesis.
But debate in cognitive science frequently assumes some more robust conception of
modularity; of which the most well known and most demanding is the one developed
in Fodor (1983). On this view, modules are functionally characterizable cognitive 
mechanisms which are (at least paradigmatically) domain specific, informationally
encapsulated, innate, mandatory, fast relative to central processes, shallow, neurally
localized, exhibit characteristic breakdown patterns, are inaccessible, and have char-
acteristic ontogenetic timetables (Fodor, 1983).3
Though the full-fledged Fodorian notion has been highly influential in many areas
of cognitive science (Garfield, 1987), it has not played much role in debate over MM,4
and for good reason. The thesis that minds are largely or entirely composed of Fodorian
modules is obviously implausible. Indeed, some of the entries on Fodor’s list – relative
speed and shallowness, for example – make little sense when applied to central 
systems (Carruthers, chapter 1; Sperber, forthcoming). And even where Fodor’s prop-
erties can be sensibly ascribed – as in the case of innateness – they carry a heavy
justificatory burden that few seem much inclined to shoulder (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Sperber, 1996).
In any case, there is a broad consensus that not all the characteristics on Fodor’s
original list are of equal theoretical import. Rather, domain specificity and informa-
tional encapsulation are widely regarded as most central. Both these properties 
concern the architecturally imposed5 informational restrictions to which cognitive 
mechanisms are subject – the range of representations they can access – though the
kinds of restriction involved are different.
Domain specificity is a restriction on the representations a cognitive mechanism
can take as input – that “trigger” it or “turn it on.” Roughly, a mechanism is domain
specific (as opposed to domain general) to the extent that it can only take as input
a highly restricted range of representations.6 Standard candidates include mechanisms
for low-level visual perception, face recognition, and arithmetic.
Informational encapsulation is a restriction on the kinds of information a mech-
anism can use as a resource once so activated – paradigmatically, though not essen-
tially, information stored in memory. Slightly more precisely, a cognitive mechanism
is encapsulated to the extent it can access, in the course of its computations, less
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than all of the information available to the organism as a whole (Fodor, 1983). Standard
candidates include mechanisms, such as those for low-level visual perception and
phonology, which do not draw on the full range of an organism’s beliefs and 
goals.
To be sure, there are many characteristics other than domain specificity and encap-
sulation that have been ascribed to modules. But if one uses “module” as more than
a mere terminological expedient – as more than just a nice way of saying “cognitive
mechanism” – yet deny they possess either of these properties, then one could with
some justification be accused of changing the subject. In view of this, I will tend
when discussing more robust conceptions of modularity to assume that modules 
must be domain specific and/or encapsulated. This has a number of virtues. First,
these properties clearly figure prominently in dispute over MM. Moreover – and in
contrast to the minimal module version of the Composition Thesis discussed earlier
– the claim that minds are largely or entirely composed of domain specific and/or
encapsulated mechanisms is a genuinely interesting one. Not only does it go beyond
the banal claim that our minds are comprised from functionally characterizable 
cognitive mechanisms; but it is also a claim that opponents of MM almost invari-
ably deny. In later sections I will consider the plausibility of this thesis; but first 
I need to discuss the other two theses associated with MM.
1.2 Plurality Thesis
Advocates of MM sometimes suggest their position is distinctive and interesting in
part because it countenances a large number of cognitive mechanisms. In spelling
out their position, for example, Tooby and Cosmides maintain: “our cognitive architec-
ture resembles a confederation of hundreds or thousands of functionally dedicated
computers (often called modules).” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1995, p. xiv)
This suggests a commitment to what I earlier called the Plurality Thesis: i.e. that
the human mind contains a great many modules.
How interesting and distinctive is this thesis? If formulated in terms of a robust
notion of modularity, it appears quite radical. After all, there are many who deny
that domain specific and/or encapsulated devices have a substantial role to play in
our cognitive economy. But what if the Plurality Thesis is formulated using the 
minimal notion of a module? Would this be an interesting and distinctive claim?
Certainly, advocates of MM sometimes appear to suggest that it is. For example
Carruthers claims: “those evolutionary psychologists who have defended the claim
that the mind consists of a great many modular components (Tooby and Cosmides,
1992; Sperber, 1996; Pinker, 1997) are defending a thesis of considerable interest,
even if ‘module’ just means ‘component.’ ” (Carruthers, chapter 1)
The idea seems to be that while virtually all cognitive scientists think minds are
composed from distinct, functionally characterizable devices, many reject the claim
that there are lots of such devices. According to Carruthers, for example, it is a claim
rejected by “those who . . . picture the mind as a big general-purpose computer 
with a limited number of distinct input and output links to the world” (Carruthers,
chapter 1, p. 000). In which case, it may seem that MM is an interesting thesis even
when formulated in terms of the minimal notion of a module.
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On reflection, however, it’s hard to see how this could be right: how a mere plur-
ality of functionally specifiable mechanisms could make for an interesting and dis-
tinctive MM. This is because even radical opponents of MM endorse the view that minds
contain a great many such components. So, for instance, the picture of the mind as a
big general-purpose, “classical” computer – roughly, the sort of general-purpose device
that manipulates symbols according to algorithmically specifiable rules – is often 
(and rightly) characterized as being firmly at odds with MM. Yet big general-purpose
computers are not simple entities. On the contrary, they are almost invariably
decomposable into a huge number of functionally characterizable submechanisms.7
So, for example, a standard von Neumann-type architecture decomposes into a calcu-
lating unit, a control unit, a fast-to-access memory, a slow-to-access memory, and
so on; and each of these decomposes further into smaller functional units, which 
are themselves decomposable into submechanisms, and so on. As a consequence, a 
standard von Neumann machine will typically have hundreds or even thousands of
subcomponents.8 Call this a version of massive modularity if you like. But it surely
isn’t an interesting or distinctive one.
1.3 Central Modularity
So far we have discussed the Composition and Plurality theses and seen that both
are interesting on a robust construal of modules, but that neither seems interesting
or distinctive on the minimal conception. But there is another thesis that requires
our attention, the thesis of Central Modularity, which states that modules are found
not merely at the periphery of the mind but also in those central regions respons-
ible for reasoning and decision making.
This does not strictly follow from any of the claims discussed so far since one
might deny there are any central systems for reasoning and decision making. But
this is not the view that advocates of MM seek to defend. Indeed, a large part of
what distinguishes MM from the earlier, well-known modularity hypothesis defended
by Fodor (1983) and others is that the modular structure of the mind is not restricted
to input systems (those responsible for perception, including language perception)
and output systems (those responsible for producing behavior). Advocates of MM accept
the Fodorian thesis that such peripheral systems are modular. But pace Fodor, they
maintain that the central systems responsible for reasoning and decision making are
largely or entirely modular as well (Jackendoff, 1992). So, for example, it has been
suggested that there are modules for such central processes as social reasoning (Cosmides
and Tooby, 1992), biological categorization (Pinker, 1994), and probabilistic inference
(Gigerenzer, 1994 and 1996). In what follows, then, I assume MM is committed to
some version of Central Modularity.
Again, how interesting a thesis is this? If formulated in terms of the minimal notion,
it’s hard to see how Central Modularity could be an interesting and distinctive one.
After all, even those who endorse paradigmatically nonmodular views of central 
cognition can readily accept the claim. For example, advocates of the “Big Computer”
view of central systems can accept the claim that central cognition is entirely 
subserved by a great many minimal modules since big computers are themselves com-
posed of a great many such entities. All this is, of course, wholly compatible with
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there being some suitable modification that makes for an interesting version of Central
Modularity. But the point I want to insist on here is that if one’s arguments succeed
only in supporting this version of the thesis, then they fail to support a distinctive
and interesting version of MM.
Things look rather different if a robust conception of modules is adopted. Here,
the degree to which one’s version of Central Modularity is interesting will depend
on (a) the extent to which central cognition is subserved by domain specific and/or
encapsulated mechanisms and (b) how many such modules there are. Both these 
questions could be answered in a variety of different ways. At one extreme, for 
example, one might adopt the following view:
Strong Central Modularity: All central systems are domain specific and/or encap-
sulated, and there are a great many of them.
That would be a genuinely radical position since it implies that there are no domain
general, informationally unencapsulated central systems. But this Strong Central
Modularity is very implausible. For as we will see in later sections, there are no good
reasons to accept it, and some reason to think it is false. At the other extreme, one
might maintain that:
Weak Central Modularity: There are a number of domain specific and/or 
encapsulated central systems, but there are also nonmodular – domain general
and unencapsulated – central systems as well.
Such a proposal is not without interest. But it is not especially radical in that it does
not stray far from the old-fashioned peripheral modularity advocated by Fodor. Nor
is it implausible in the way that Strong Central Modularity is. Nonetheless, as we
will see, there is at present little reason to accept it. The general arguments for MM
don’t support this view; and the empirical case for even this version of Central
Modularity is surprisingly weak.
2 The Allure of Massive Modularity
Though MM is an empirical hypothesis, many claim it is plausible in the light of
quite general, theoretical arguments about the nature of evolution, cognition and com-
putation. But even the most prominent and plausible of these arguments are unsatis-
factory since they fail to discriminate between interesting versions of MM – such as
those that imply Strong or Weak Central Modularity – and other widespread views.9
2.1 Evolvability
A discussion of evolutionary stability in Simon (1962) is sometimes invoked as an
argument for MM (Carston, 1996; Carruthers, chapter 1). According to Simon, for an
evolutionary process to reliably assemble complex functional systems – biological
systems in particular – the overall system needs to be semi-decomposable: hier-
archically organized from components with relatively limited connections to each other.
Simon illustrates the point with a parable of two watchmakers – Hora and Tempus
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– both highly regarded for their fine watches. But while Hora prospered, Tempus became
poorer and poorer and finally lost his shop. The reason:
The watches the men made consisted of about 1000 parts each. Tempus had so con-
structed his that if he had one partially assembled and had to put it down – to answer
the phone, say – it immediately fell to pieces and had to be reassembled from the ele-
ments . . . The watches Hora handled were no less complex . . . but he had designed them
so that he could put together sub-assemblies of about ten elements each. Ten of these
sub-assemblies, again, could be put together into a larger sub-assembly and a system
of ten of the latter constituted the whole watch. Hence, when Hora had to put down a
partly assembled watch in order to answer the phone, he lost only a small part of his
work, and he assembled his watches in only a fraction of the man-hours it took Tempus.
(Simon, 1962)
The obvious moral – and the one Simon invites us to accept – is that evolutionary
stability requires that complex systems be hierarchically organized from dissociable
subsystems; and according to Carruthers and Carston, this militates in favor of MM
(Carston, 1996, p. 75).
Response. Though evolutionary stability may initially appear to militate in favor
of MM, it is in fact only an argument for the familiar mechanistic thesis that com-
plex machines are hierarchically assembled from (and decomposable into) many sub-
components. But this clearly falls short of the claim that all (or even any) are domain
specific or encapsulated. Rather it supports at most the sort of banal Plurality Thesis
discussed earlier; one that is wholly compatible with even a Big Computer view of
central processes. All it implies is that if there are such complex central systems,
they will need to be hierarchically organized into dissociable subsystems – which
incidentally, was the view Simon and his main collaborators endorsed all along (Simon,
1962; Newell, 1990).
2.2 Analogy with other biological systems
Throughout the biological world – from cells to cellular assemblies, whole organs and
so on – one finds hierarchical organization into semi-decomposable components. We
should expect the same to be true of cognition (Chomsky, 1980; Carruthers, chapter 1).
Response. Same problem as the previous argument. Though all this is correct, it
is at most an argument for the claim that our minds are semi-decomposable systems
– hierarchically organized into dissociable subsystems – a conclusion that is in no way
incompatible with even the most radically nonmodular accounts of central systems.
2.3 Task specificity
There are a great many cognitive tasks whose solutions impose quite different demands.
So, for example, the demands on vision are distinct from those of speech recognition,
of mind-reading, cheater-detection, probabilistic judgment, grammar induction, and
so on. Moreover, since it is very hard to believe there could be a single general 
inferencing mechanism for all of them, for each such task we should postulate the
existence of a distinct mechanism, whose internal processes are computationally 
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specialized for processing different sorts of information in the way required to solve
the task (Carruthers, chapter 1; Cosmides and Tooby, 1992, 1994).
Response. Two points. First, if the alternatives were MM or a view of minds as
comprised of just a single general-purpose cognitive device, then I too would opt for
MM. But these are clearly not the only options. On the contrary, one can readily
deny that central systems are modular while still insisting there are plenty of 
modules for perception, motor control, selective attention, and so on. In other words, 
the issue is, not merely whether some cognitive tasks require specialized modules but
whether the sorts of tasks associated with central cognition – paradigmatically, reason-
ing and decision making – typically require a proliferation of such mechanisms.
Second, it’s important to see that the addition of functionally dedicated mech-
anisms is not the only way of enabling a complex system to address multiple tasks.
An alternative is to provide some relatively functionally inspecific mechanism with
requisite bodies of information for solving the tasks it confronts. This is a familiar
proposal among those who advocate nonmodular accounts of central processes. Indeed,
advocates of nonmodular reasoning architectures routinely assume that reasoning devices
have access to a huge amount of specialized information on a great many topics,
much of which will be learned but some of which may be innately specified (Newell,
1990; Anderson, 1990). Moreover, it is one that plausibly explains much of the pro-
liferation of cognitive competences that humans exhibit throughout their lives – e.g.
the ability to reason about historical issues as opposed to politics or gene splicing
or restaurants. To be sure, it might be that each such task requires a distinct mech-
anism, but such a conclusion does not flow from general argument alone. For all we
know, the same is true of the sorts of tasks advocates of MM discuss. It may be that
the capacity to perform certain tasks is explained by the existence of specialized mech-
anisms. But how often this is the case for central cognition is an almost entirely
open question that is not adjudicated by the argument from task specificity.
2.4 Bottleneck argument
If central processing were subserved by only a small number of general-purpose mech-
anisms as opposed to a multiplicity of modules, there would be a kind of tractability
problem: a serious processing bottleneck that would prohibit the formation of beliefs
on different topics in real time (Carruthers, chapter 1).
Response. For this to be an objection to the claim that we possess only a small
number of central systems it would need to be that, as a matter of fact, central 
cognition is not subject to such bottlenecks. But it’s far from clear this is true. Second,
even if we assume for the sake of argument that there are few such bottlenecks, it’s
utterly unclear MM is the only way to avoid them. What MM permits is the parallel
operation of multiple mechanisms. But it’s not the only way to exact this benefit
since there are at least two other (not mutually exclusive) ways that parallelism can
increase the speed of processing. First, at the level of cognitive architecture, it may
be that the component cognitive parts of a given non-modular mechanism operate
at the same time. Second, there may be (and surely is) parallelism at the level of
implementation so that individual, non-modular cognitive mechanisms have a par-
allel implementation within the circuits of the brain.
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2.5 Computational tractability
It is common to argue for MM on the grounds that the alternatives are computa-
tionally intractable. In brief, the argument is as follows: Human cognitive processes
are realized by computational mechanisms. But for this to be the case, our cognitive
mechanisms would need to be computationally tractable; and this in turn requires
that they be informationally encapsulated – that they have access to less than all
the information available to the mind as a whole. Hence, the mind is composed of
informationally encapsulated cognitive mechanisms.
Response. If one is disinclined to accept a computational account of cognitive pro-
cesses, this is not an argument one is likely to take seriously. But even if one endorses
a computational account of the mind, the argument still doesn’t work. There is a
long story about what’s wrong (see Samuels, 2005). But the short version is that com-
putational tractability does not require informational encapsulation in any standard
sense of that expression; and the claim that some other kind of “encapsulation” is
involved is tantamount to relabeling. As ordinarily construed, a mechanism is encap-
sulated only if – by virtue of architectural constraints – there is some relatively 
determinate class of informational states that it cannot access. (For example, the para-
digmatic cases of encapsulated devices – low-level perceptual devices – cannot access
the agent’s beliefs or desires in the course of their computations.) While such an archi-
tectural constraint may be one way to engender tractability, it is clearly not the only
way. Rather, what’s required is that the mechanism be frugal in its use of informa-
tion: that it not engage in exhaustive search but only use a restricted amount of the
available information. Moreover, this might be achieved in a variety of ways, most
obviously by heuristic and approximation techniques of the sort familiar from com-
puter science and Artificial Intelligence.
So, it would seem that the tractability argument fails: frugality, not encapsula-
tion, is what’s required. Carruthers has responded to this, however, by drawing a dis-
tinction between two notions of encapsulation: the standard notion, which he calls 
“narrow-scope encapsulation” and another notion, “wide-scope encapsulation,” on
which the “operations of a module can’t be affected by most of the information in
a mind, without there being some determinate subdivision between the information
that can affect the system and the information that can’t” (Carruthers, chapter 1, 
p. 000). But this really isn’t an interesting notion of encapsulation. For not only is
it different from what most theorists mean by “encapsulation,” but it’s simply what
you get by denying exhaustive search; and since virtually no one thinks exhaustive
search is characteristic of human cognition, the present kind of “encapsulation” is
neither distinctive nor interesting.
3 The Empirical Case for Massive Modularity
So far I have focused on the theoretical arguments for MM and found them wanting.
But what of the empirical evidence? Many have claimed MM is plausible in light of
the available experimental data (Sperber, 1996; Pinker, 1997; Pinker, 2005). I am
unconvinced. Although there is considerable evidence for relatively low-level modular
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mechanisms – a point I return to in section 5 – the experimental case for central
modularity is not strong (Samuels, 1998; Fodor, 2000). To the extent things seem
otherwise, I suspect it is because the interpretation of data is heavily driven by a
prior acceptance of the general theoretical arguments for MM – arguments which as
we have seen there is little reason to endorse.10
In some cases, the reliance on general theoretical considerations in the absence
of convincing data is egregious. (My current favorite example is the “homicide mod-
ule” hypothesis advocated by Buss and his collaborators; see Buss and Duntley, 2005.)
But even in cases where the influence of such considerations is less obvious, the data
for Central Modularity are uncompelling. Often the problem is that the putative evid-
ence for specialized modules can be better explained in terms of other, less specific
processes. This is well illustrated by arguably the flagship case of a putative reasoning
module: a dedicated mechanism for social contract reasoning (Comsides and Tooby,
1992; Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992). Advocates of this hypothesis sometimes represent
it as a kind of modularist assault on the “doctrinal ‘citadel’ of . . . general-purpose
processes”: human reasoning (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). But the main experimental
support for the hypothesis – evidence of so-called content effects in Wason’s Selection
Task – can be very plausibly explained in terms of quite general features of language
comprehension and, hence, provides no support for a dedicated social contract reason-
ing mechanism (Sperber et al., 1995; Fodor 2000; Sperber and Girotto, 2003).
Another problem with the experimental case for Central Modularity is that even
where the data suggest some kind of specialized cognitive structure for a given domain,
it seldom adjudicates clearly between claims about the existence of specialized 
mechanisms and claims about the existence of specialized bodies of knowledge, such as
a mentally represented theory. The former are modularity theses in the relevant sense
while the latter are wholly compatible with a highly nonmodular account of central
processing on which different bodies of knowledge are used by a small set of non-
modular mechanisms (Newell, 1990; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; Fodor, 2000). This
point is well illustrated by the debate over folk biology. Many have proposed the
existence of specialized cognitive structures for folk biology. But while some main-
tain it is subserved by a dedicated module (Pinker, 1994; Atran, 1998, 2001), others
claim merely that we posses a body of information – a theory – that is deployed by
relatively inspecific inferential devices (Carey, 1995). The problem is that the main
available evidence regarding folk biology – e.g. cross-cultural evidence for uni-
versality, developmental evidence of precocity, anthropological evidence for rapid 
cultural transmission, and so on – fails to adjudicate between these options. What
they suggest is that folk biology involves some dedicated – and perhaps innate –
cognitive structure. But once the general arguments for MM are rejected, there is 
little reason to interpret it as favoring a modular account of folk biology.
Finally, even where the evidence for previously unrecognized modules is strong, it
seldom turns out to be clear evidence for central modularity. Consider, for example,
the “geometric module” hypothesis advocated by Cheng, Gallistel, and others (Gallistel,
1990; Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999). Though contentious, the evidence for such a
device is quite compelling. But this does not support a modular view of central pro-
cesses since the geometric module is most plausibly construed as part of vision or
visuomotor control (Pylyshyn, 1999). Perhaps surprisingly, a similar point applies to
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what is widely regarded as among the strongest candidates for Central Modularity:
the theory of mind module (ToMM) hypothesized by Alan Leslie and his collabor-
ators (Leslie et al., 2004). The ToMM hypothesis is not without problems (see Nicholls
and Stich, 2002). But even if we put these to one side, the existence of ToMM would
do little to strengthen the case for Central Modularity since in its most recent and
plausible incarnations, ToMM is characterized as a relatively low-level device for 
selective attention; and moreover one which relies heavily on decidedly nonmodular
executive systems – most notably the “selection processor” – in order to perform its
characteristic function (Leslie et al., 2004). Thus what is widely viewed as a strong
candidate for Central Modularity both fails to be a clear example of a central system,
and also presupposes the existence of nonmodular systems.
4 Some Reasons to Doubt Massive Modularity
So, the experimental evidence for Central Modularity is rather less strong than one
would expect if MM were true. But there are also familiar – and in my view very
plausible – claims about human thought which collectively suggest the existence of
paradigmatically nonmodular central systems. In particular:
Conceptual integration. We are capable of freely combining concepts across dif-
ferent subject matters or content domains (Carruthers, 2003). So, for example, it’s
not merely that I can think about colors, about numbers, about shapes, about food,
and so on. Rather I can have thoughts that concern all these things – e.g. that I had
two roughly round, red steaks for lunch.
Generality of thought capacities. Not only can we freely combine concepts, we
can also deploy the resulting representations in our theoretical and practical delib-
erations – to assess their truth or plausibility, but also to assess their impact on our
plans and projects.
Inferential holism. Given surrounding conditions – especially, background beliefs
– the relevance of a representation to the theoretical or practical tasks in which one
engages can change dramatically.11 Indeed, it would seem that given appropriate back-
ground assumptions, almost any belief can be relevant to the task in which one engages
(Copeland, 1993).
Task range. We are capable of performing an exceedingly wide – perhaps unbounded
– range of cognitive tasks of both a practical and theoretical nature (Newell, 1990).
Between task correlations. There is a huge amount of empirical evidence that per-
formance on many central cognitive tasks co-varies. Thus psychometric studies appear
to show that performance in any single task (e.g. arithmetic) is a reliable predictor
of performance in a wide range of other cognitive tasks (e.g. spatial reasoning, 
deductive reasoning, spelling, reading, and so on) (Anderson, 1992).
The existence of general mental retardation. There are various organic disorders 
– most notably Down’s syndrome – which produce across the board deficits in the 
performance of such highly correlated intellectual tasks (Anderson, 1998).
Taken individually, none of these phenomena mandates the existence of nonmodular
central systems; and nor collectively do they preclude the existence of modular ones.
In other words, the above are clearly compatible with what I called Weak Central
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Modularity. Nevertheless, taken together, they do strongly suggest the existence of
nonmodular – domain general and unencapsulated – mechanisms for thought and,
hence, that Strong Central Modularity is false. This is because the assumption there
are such mechanisms goes some way to help explain the above facts.
In contrast, if one rejects nonmodular mechanisms altogether, the prospects of accom-
modating these phenomena appear bleak; and to date, efforts to do so have been
deeply unsatisfactory. Some strongly modular architectures – such as those embodied
in Brook’s animats – are precisely specified computational proposals but clearly 
inadequate to explaining the above phenomena (Kirsh, 1991; Bryson, 2000). In 
contrast, other modular proposals are so vague as to be almost wholly lacking in
content. So, for example, it is common for advocates of MM to claim that the above
kinds of phenomena can be largely explained by the fact that minds contain so many
modules: “a network of subsystems that feed each other in criss-crossing but intel-
ligible ways” (Pinker, 2005; see also Pinker, 1994; Buss, 2000). But these are not
explanations so much as statements of the problem given a commitment to MM. 
The challenge is to sketch the right sort of plurality and “criss-crossing” between
mechanisms – one that could plausibly exhibit the above sorts of phenomena. 
Finally, even those proposals that avoid vacuity or obvious inadequacy only seem
to accommodate the above phenomena to the extent that they smuggle nonmodular
mechanisms back in. So, for example, Carruthers has sketched what purports to be
an MM account of practical and theoretical reasoning that seeks to accommodate the
above sorts of phenomena (Carruthers, 2003, 2004). But the proposal fails since 
it posits various mechanisms – specifically, a “relevance module” and a practical 
reasoning system – which are domain general and, despite Carruthers’ claims to the
contrary, unencapsulated as well.12 So, the prospects of accommodating the above
phenomena without positing nonmodular mechanisms appear bleak; and in view of
the lack of argument or evidence for MM, I’m inclined to think the effort of trying
to do so is, in any case, wasted.
5 Whither Modularity?
The main burden of this chapter has been to argue that the case for an interesting
and distinctive version of MM is not strong because there is little reason to suppose
central processes are modular. In this section I conclude with some comments on a
more radical view: that little or none of cognition – including peripheral systems for
low-level perception – are modular in character. In my view, this claim goes too far
since there are strong empirical grounds for positing a wide array of non-central
modules. Efforts to draw grand conclusions about the irrelevance of modularity thus
strike me as, at best, premature and, at worst, a serious distortion of our current,
best picture of the cognitive mind.
5.1 Evidence for modularity
As with almost any scientific hypothesis, the empirical case for peripheral modular-
ity is not so strong as to exclude all competitors. But what matters is the relative
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plausibility of competing hypotheses; and on balance I’m inclined to think the 
evidence – convergent evidence from neuroanatomy, psychophysics, computational
modeling, developmental psychology, and so on – supports the existence of modules
for many non-central cognitive processes.
The case is most plausible for low-level (or “early”) visual processes – for ex-
ample, those involved in the perception of color, shape from motion, and depth from
disparity. In such cases one finds illusions strongly suggestive of mechanisms encap-
sulated from belief (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999). Moreover, in contrast to central
processes, we possess quite detailed and plausible computational models of these per-
ceptual processes: models which suggest the kinds of computations involved are highly
specialized for very specific sorts of input and draw on very restricted kinds of informa-
tion (Palmer, 1999). So, for example, the computations involved in computing depth
from disparity are quite different from those involved in computing lightness; and
the sorts of information relevant to one are irrelevant to the other. Finally, and again
in contrast to central processes, a fair amount is known about the neural basis of
such processes; and again what we know suggests that the modular picture is very
plausible (Zeki and Bartels, 1998).
Nor is the case for modularity only plausible for low-level perceptual mechanisms.
Though perhaps less compelling, there is still a good case to be made elsewhere, 
including: face recognition (McKone and Kanwisher, 2005), place-specific visual 
processing (Epstein et al., 1999), approximate arithmetic (Butterworth, 1999;
Feigenson et al., 2004), and grammar-specific processing (van der Lely et al., 2004).
In each such case, one finds a pattern of results strongly suggestive of modularity:
evidence of dissociations, evidence for idiosyncratic styles of processing or distinct-
ive representational formats, and ERP and imaging studies suggestive of distinctive
neural responses. All this is, I suppose, good evidence for modularity. Not beyond
dispute, but strong nonetheless.
Why, then, do so many reject the modularity of such processes? Since the empir-
ical literature on such matters is enormous, it will not be possible to address much
of what has been said here. But fortunately, Prinz (chapter 2) provides an excellent
(and brief ) presentation of the case against peripheral modularity: one that draws
together many familiar strands of argument, but also exhibits many of the problems
found in other critiques. In what follows, then, I focus primarily on Prinz’s argu-
ments, though many of my comments apply more broadly than this.
5.2 Arguments against domain specificity
According to Prinz, “alleged modules may have domain-specific components” – 
e.g. proprietary rules and representations – but they “don’t seem to be proprietary
throughout.” Prinz’s argument for this conclusion divides in two. First, he dis-
tinguishes between some different senses of “specificity” and “domain” and argues
that for a mechanism to be interestingly domain specific it should be exclusively
dedicated to processing some relatively inclusive subject matter. Next, Prinz argues
that the main alleged examples of modules – vision, language, mathematics, folk
physics etc. – are not domain specific in this sense. Neither part of the argument
strikes me as convincing.
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Characterizing domain specificity
I see no reason to assume that for a mechanism to be interestingly domain specific,
its domain must be inclusive – as broad as language, vision or theory of mind, for
example. First, the assumption fits poorly with how the notion of domain specificity
in fact gets used in cognitive science. Many of the most prominent advocates of 
modularity – Fodor and Sperber, for example – explicitly deny that domains must 
be broad in this way (Fodor, 1983; Sperber, 1994); and many of the most carefully
studied examples of domain-specific mechanisms – depth from disparity, for example
– are not all that inclusive.
Second, contrary to what Prinz appears to suggest, the admittance of fine-grained
domains need not trivialize claims about domain specificity. There is nothing trivial,
for example, in claiming we possess mechanisms exclusively dedicated for edge 
detection, scene geometry, or approximate arithmetic. Of course, if one insisted on
treating just any entity for which some subject matter could be specified as a bona
fide domain-specific mechanism, then triviality threatens. Therein lies the route to
mechanisms for, say, reasoning about camels in London on Tuesdays, or planning
wheat-free picnics in 2005. But this is not a problem with a fine-grained notion of
domain specificity, or indeed with the notion of domain specificity at all. Rather, it’s
a problem that arises when one adopts a silly attitude towards the individuation of
cognitive mechanisms. The main problem with a distinct “mechanism” for reasoning
exclusively about camels in London on Tuesdays is not that its domain is too fine-
grained, but that there is no such mechanism. To be sure, there are genuine issues
about what the criteria for individuating cognitive mechanisms ought to be. But the
present discussion highlights that silliness ensues if one individuates by domain alone.
My suggestion: Don’t do it.
Evidence against domain specificity?
Even laying aside the above concern, Prinz’s argument still fails since the main kind
of evidence he cites is largely irrelevant to the domain specificity of cognitive mech-
anisms. Prinz objects to many alleged cases of domain specificity on the grounds
that the processes involved in one kind of task share cognitive/neural resources with
processes of other sorts. So, for example: language processing shares resources with
nonlinguistic pattern recognition; mind-reading shares resources with language 
processing and also uses working memory; arithmetic shares resources with lan-
guage and spatial processing, and so on. On the basis of such considerations, Prinz
concludes that there are unlikely to be domain-specific mechanisms of the sort that
modularists posit.
What are we to make of this argument? The logic is rather murky. In particular,
it is very unclear how one gets from claims about resource sharing to conclusions
about the absence of domain-specific mechanisms. That said, the general idea
appears to be that since domain-specific mechanisms are exclusively dedicated to 
processing a given domain of information, there cannot be domain-specific devices
for processes that depend on resources recruited for many different domains. On
reflection, however, this argument turns on a shift between two different senses in
which a domain specific mechanism might be exclusively dedicated:
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The mechanism only processes information in a given domain, D;
The mechanism only processes – and, moreover, is the only mechanism that
processes – information in D.
The former is one to which advocates of domain-specific modules are plausibly 
committed; but it is not one on which resource sharing counts as evidence against
domain specificity. Thus the existence of mechanisms which are exclusively dedic-
ated in this sense is perfectly compatible with the very familiar position – one endorsed
by many modularists – on which cognitive processes depend on both domain-specific
and domain-general mechanisms. For example: Leslie and his collaborators claim mind-
reading depends on both a domain-specific theory of mind module and domain-
general executive systems (Leslie, 2003). In contrast, the second notion of exclusive
dedication does license inferences from resource sharing to a failure of domain specificity
and, hence, precludes precisely such cases. But the problem for Prinz is that advoc-
ates of domain specific mechanisms are clearly not committed to mechanisms which
are exclusively dedicated in this way.
5.3 Evidence against informational encapsulation
Let’s turn to the case against encapsulated mechanisms. Prinz’s strategy is to try to
undermine what is widely regarded as the most plausible case for encapsulation: 
perceptual illusions which modularists claim result from the operation of low-level
perceptual mechanisms. But pace Fodor, Pylyshyn, and others, Prinz maintains 
illusions are not good evidence for encapsulation because there is a competing 
hypothesis – what he calls the “trumping hypothesis” – which explains the existence
of illusions and, moreover, does a better job of accommodating evidence of top-down
effects on perception. Again, I am unconvinced.
First, the trumping hypothesis itself is hard to make sense of. The rough idea is
simple enough: though belief is trumped by perception when the two are in conflict,
it can influence perception when no conflict exists. But how exactly is this to occur?
On the most natural interpretation, what’s required is some kind of consistency check
between belief (e.g. that the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are of equal length) and
a representation produced by some perceptual process (e.g. that the lines are of dif-
ferent length). But if the trumping hypothesis were correct, such a checking process
would presuppose the existence of encapsulated perceptual mechanisms. After all,
for a consistency check to occur at all, there must be a perceptual representation –
i.e. the output of some perceptual device – that can be checked against belief. And
since, according to the trumping hypothesis, beliefs only influence perceptual process-
ing when no conflict exists, it cannot be that beliefs are implicated in producing the
output of this perceptual device.
In any case, the data cited by Prinz do not merit the rejection of encapsulated
low-level perceptual mechanisms. Following a long tradition, Prinz argues that top-
down effects on perception are incompatible with encapsulation. But the argument
turns on the assumption that a “truly encapsulated system would be insulated from
any external influence”; and this is simply false. On the contrary, advocates of encap-
sulation agree with their opponents that there are top-down influences on perception.
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What’s at issue is the character and extent of this influence. Specifically, what advo-
cates of encapsulated early perception are most concerned to reject is a picture –
widely associated with Bruner’s New Look psychology – on which early perceptual
mechanisms have something approximating an unlimited access to one’s beliefs and
desires in the course of their online processing (Fodor, 1983, p. 60; Pylyshyn, 1999).
But this rejection is wholly compatible with many sorts of external cognitive
influence on perception, including:
Shifts in loci of focal attention brought about by clues, instructions, or prefer-
ences about where to look;
Top-down processing within a perceptual modality;
Cross-talk between perceptual systems;
Diachronic or developmental effects in which one’s beliefs and goals influence the
development of perceptual systems – e.g. via training effects;
Beliefs and desires influencing late perceptual processes, such as perceptual 
categorization.13
As far as I can tell, all the putative objections to encapsulation Prinz cites fall 
into one or other of these categories. For example, it is very plausible that the influ-
ence of verbal cues and decisions on our experience of ambiguous figures consists
in the production of shifts in the locus of focal attention (Peterson and Gibson, 1991;
Pylyshyn, 1999). Similarly, the role of expectations – e.g. in producing non-
veridical experiences – is plausibly viewed as an influence on late perceptual pro-
cesses. And so on. In view of this, I see no reason here to deny the modularity of
early perception.
Conclusion
We started by clarifying the sort of view that advocates of MM seek to defend. We
then saw that the main theoretical arguments for views of this sort fail to provide
reason to prefer them over other competing proposals, such as those on which much
of cognition depends on nonmodular mechanisms with access to bodies of special-
ized information. Next, we saw that the available experimental case for MM is not
strong because there is little evidence for the existence of modular central systems.
Moreover, we saw that there is some reason to reject a strong MM which claims that
all central systems are domain specific and/or encapsulated. Finally, we saw that
while MM is not well supported by the arguments and evidence, it would be wrong
to maintain that minds are not modular to any interesting degree since there are
good reasons to suppose that more peripheral regions of the mind – especially for
low-level perception – are modular in character. Where does this leave us? If our
assessment of the evidence is correct, then the most plausible position to adopt 
is one that takes a middle way between those, such as Carruthers, who endorse a
thoroughgoing massive modularity and those, such as Prinz, who reject modularity
altogether. The situation is, in other words, much as Fodor advocated over two decades
ago (Fodor, 1983).
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Notes
1 There is a familiar notion of modularity, sometimes called Chomskian modules, on which
modules are not mechanisms but systems of mental representation – bodies of mentally
represented knowledge or information – such as a grammar or a theory (Segal, 1996;
Samuels 2000; Fodor 2000). Paradigmatically, such structures are truth-evaluable in that
it makes sense to ask of the representations if they are true or false. Moreover, they are
often assumed to be innate and/or subject to informational constraints (e.g. inaccessible
to consciousness). Although Chomskian modules are an important sort of cognitive struc-
ture, they are not the ones most relevant to the sort of position advocated by massive
modularists. This is because advocates of MM appear to assume that modules are a species
of cognitive mechanism. I say this for two main reasons. First, it is very plausible on 
the basis of their explicit comments about what modules are. Dan Sperber, for example,
characterizes modules as a species of “autonomous mental mechanism” (Sperber, 2002;
Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004), while Cosmides and Tooby characterize them as “function-
ally dedicated computers”; all of which indicates a conception of modules as cognitive
mechanisms. Moreover, if modules are construed as Chomskian modules, it’s hard to make
sense of what advocates of MM say about the relationship between their position and
other views. So, for example, MM is routinely (and correctly) presented as being in 
opposition to views on which central cognition depends on the activity of one (or a few)
general-purpose computers (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Carruthers, chapter 1). But if 
modules are construed as systems of mental representations, it’s unclear why any opposi-
tion should exist. After all, the claim that central cognition depends on, say, a single 
universal Turing machine is wholly compatible with the existence of a great many 
Chomskian modules – bodies of information deployed by the mechanism. This is, 
however, surely not the sort of view advocates of MM seek to defend. Indeed Carruthers
(chapter 1) says as much when explicitly contrasting this sort of “informational modu-
larity” with the “computational modularity” he seeks to defend.
2 The following discussion is by no means exhaustive. For more detailed discussions of dif-
ferent notions of modularity see Segal, 1996, and Samuels, 2000.
3 This list is sometimes construed as a definition of modularity (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
But Fodor rejects this in favor of the idea that modularity admits of degree and that cog-
nitive mechanisms are modular to the extent that they possess all or most of the features
on this list to some interested degree. (Fodor, 1983, p. 37; Coltheart, 1999).
4 Incidentally, not even Fodor adopts it in his recent discussions of MM (Fodor, 2000, 
2005).
5 To claim that a property of a cognitive mechanism is architecturally imposed, minimally
implies the following. First, they are relatively enduring characteristics of the device. Second,
they are not mere products of performance factors, such as fatigue or lapses in attention.
Finally, they are supposed to be cognitively impenetrable (Pylyshyn, 1984). To a first approx-
imation: they are not properties of the mechanism that can be changed as a result of
alterations in the beliefs, goals and other representational states of the organism.
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6 It should go without saying – though I’ll say it anyway – that the notion of domain
specificity admits of degree and that researchers who use the notion are interested in whether
we possess mechanisms that are domain specific to some interesting extent. The same
points also apply to the notion of informational encapsulation.
7 Indeed this is more-or-less guaranteed by the widespread assumption that the functional
decomposition of a “large” system will typically have many levels of aggregation (Simon,
1962). I return to this point in section 2.1.
8 A similar point applies to the sort of radical connectionism on which the mind is char-
acterized as one huge undifferentiated neural network. This is often – and rightly – seen
as the antithesis of MM (Pinker, 1997); and yet it is committed to a vast plurality of
mechanisms. After all, each node in a neural network is a mechanism; and on any 
version of the connectionist story, there will a great many such nodes.
9 There are other less plausible arguments for MM, which due to space limitations I will
not consider here. For further discussion of other arguments for MM see Tooby and Cosmides,
1992; Sperber, 1994; and Samuels, 2000.
10 See Prinz (chapter 2, IS THE MIND REALLY MODULAR?) for complementary criticisms of the
experimental case for MM.
11 The same would also appear to be true of many of a representation’s epistemic properties
– e.g. simplicity and conservativism.
12 They are “wide-scope encapsulated.” But as already noted, this is not encapsulation as
ordinarily construed.
13 Indeed, given that encapsulation admits of degree, an input system might be encap-
sulated to some interesting degree and yet still have access to some beliefs and goals in
the course of its operations.
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